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The study aims to establish a pro-poor growth index called the ‘Poverty Equivalent
Growth Rate’, which considers both the extent of sectoral growth and the benefits
reaching the poor in Pakistan, using 21 household surveys between 1964 and 2011.
The result reveals that despite the positive signs in agriculture growth, the growth
process may not be classifiable as pro-poor. The result points out that compared with
the non-poor, the poor overall benefited less from the revitalisation of agricultural
processes; however, the trend was reversed during 2002 to 2011 when the poverty
equivalent growth rates are higher than the growth rate of industry, manufacturing,
commodity producing and services value added, which shows sectoral growth
favours the poor more than non-poor in Pakistan.
Keywords: economic growth; poverty; inequality; sectoral composition; urban; rural;
Pakistan
JEL classifications: D31, D63, I32, O47
1. Introduction
The study aims to establish a pro-poor growth index called the ‘Poverty Equivalent
Growth Rate’, which considers both the extent of sectoral growth and the benefits reach-
ing the poor in Pakistan’s subsectors, i.e. agriculture, industry, manufacturing commod-
ity producing and services sectors. Pakistan’s economy has gone through various stages
of decline and high growth over the country’s first five decades (1960s–2000s) which
provides an interesting case study of the relationship between poverty, growth and
inequality. The data of the first five decades compiled from various resources provide a
confused picture of economic growth, poverty and unemployment, as shown in Table 1.
Recent literature and policy-oriented discussions mostly use one of the two defini-
tions for measuring pro-poor growth. Whereas first definition compares variations in
income of the poor with the non-poor and considers a pro poor growth if distributional
shifts favour the poor (Kakwani & Son, 2004). The second definition focuses more on
variations in poverty itself. Pro poor growth benefits the poor in absolute terms as per
an agreed measure of poverty (Ravallion & Chen, 2003). Rate of growth and its
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distributional pattern determine the rate of change in poverty, which reflects the extent
of pro-poor growth (Kakwani & Son, 2002). This study takes the relative definition of
pro-poor growth. However, even large absolute gains to the poor resulting from rising
inequality amidst overall economic growth are not acknowledged as ‘pro-poor growth’.
It is of utmost important to examine the performance of various sectors in order to
assess the performance of sectoral growth of Pakistan. Agriculture and industry make
the most essential sector of the Pakistani economy, i.e. the Commodity Producing Sector
(CPS). It has relatively stronger linkages for economic development and prosperity of
the country. It amounted to 46.5% of GDP in 2011 fiscal year, declining from 49.1% of
GDP in 2001–2002, reflecting an increase in the share of the non-commodity producing
sector. The CPS showed an improved performance with 3.28% growth rate in 2011 fis-
cal year compared with last year’s 1.47%. Even the moderate recovery in the agriculture
and industrial sector helped to achieve this level. However, the CPS growth remained
far below its potential due to largely unforeseen climatic factors (GoP, 2011).
The above discussion confirms the strong connection between the sectoral growth and
pro-poor growth in the context of Pakistan. The rest of the study is organised as follows:
Section 2 describes the review of literature on the relationship between pro-poor growth and
sectoral growth. The data source and methodological framework is explained in Section 3.
The estimation and interpretation of results is mentioned in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
Development Economics indicates automatic dispersion of economic benefits across all
sectors of the society. This is definitely the well-known ‘trickle down’ hypothesis, which
was primary thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. Contextually, recent studies, such as
Dollar and Kraay (2001), suggest that economic growth mitigates overall poverty. Dollar
and Kraay’s (2001) cross-country regressions study is criticised for catering for only an
average picture relating to the relation between growth and poverty, where enormous
differences across the countries are averaged out. Klasen (2004) suggested two strategies
for examining pro-poor economic growth. The first, or direct, way is a pattern of growth
that instantly elevates the incomes of the poor. This growth favours those sectors and
regions where the poor live (or are moving to) and uses the factors of production that
they possess or are able to acquire. The second way, in which economic growth can be
pro-poor, the indirect way, functions through public redistributive policies, especially
through taxes, transfers, and other government spending. Table 2 shows the different
approaches of pro-poor growth analysis.















1960s 6.8 40.2 35.7 1.35 – –
1970s 4.8 46.5 39.2 2.43 0.6 –
1980s 6.5 30.7 37.6 3.51 0.8 0.8
1990s 4.6 22.1 40.5 5.23 0.7 2.3
2000s 4.8 33.1 41.8 6.81 0.6 2.1
Sources: GoP (2012).
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Bakker (2007) investigated, in Jakarta, Indonesia, the performance of the private sec-
tor with respect to network connections for poor households. He did not find evidence
for a pro-poor partner, i.e. new connections were favourably targeted at middle and
upper-income households over the period 1998–2005, and the numbers of new connec-
tions were lower than the original targets. This study further shows that the failure to
connect the poor is not solely attributable to the private operators, and identifies disin-
centives to providing individual network connections to poor households on the part of
the municipality, the private concessionaires and poor households. Djurfeldt (2012)
examines African re-agrarianisation by using household level longitudinal data from
smallholder households in eight African countries for the period during 2002–2008. The
result concludes that pro-poor agricultural growth is concentrated in particular villages,
where it is highly inclusive. Cheema and Sial (2012) estimated the three pro-poor
growth indices, namely, Poverty Bias of Growth (PBG), Pro-poor Growth Index (PPGI)
and Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR). To determine pro-poor growth they used
eight household income and expenditure surveys conducted during 1993 and 2008.
They concluded that except for some time, the growth remained pro-poor. Zaman,
Khan, and Ahmad (2012a) examined the influence of FDI on the poor in Pakistan using
data from 1985–2011 and concluded FDI has a significant mitigating effect on poverty,
i.e. a 1% increase in FDI results in 0.46% decrease in poverty. Zaman, Khan, Ahmad,
and Shabir (2012b), using two household surveys during 1999–2006, inspected various
methods for measuring pro-poor growth rate in the Pakistani sub-sectors; that is, agricul-
ture, commodity producing, manufacturing, and services sectors. They concluded that
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reversed for a few years in themid-1990s.
Son (2003) Poverty Growth
Curve (PGC)
Thailand Economic crisis hurt the poor
proportionally more than the non-poor.
Source: Authors’ results compiled with previous literature.
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due to pro-rich federal policies in Pakistan growth was not pro-poor. Cuesta, Kabaso, and
Suarez-Becerra (2012) examined the distributional effect of public spending in Zambia
using the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey. They concluded that no evidence of
pro-poor and progressive overall public education spending was found in Zambia.
Zaman and Khilji (2013a) examine the association between poverty, income inequal-
ity and economic growth in Pakistan’s urban, rural and nationwide populations, over the
period 1964–2011. The results conclude that growth processes have not generally been
favourable to the poor during the study period. Zaman and Khilji (2013b) examine the
relationship between economic growth and poverty over following 25 years, i.e. from
the years 2011 to 2035. The results conclude that economic growth, poverty and income
inequality are strongly linked to one another that any positive shock between them
would be favourable to one variable and may be damaging to the other variable. Khan,
Khan, Zaman, and Khan (2014a) examine the relationship between agricultural techno-
logical indicators and rural poverty in Pakistan, over the period 1975–2011. The results
suggest that agricultural technology indicators are directly linked with economic growth
and rural poverty in Pakistan. Khan, Khan, Zaman, and Khan (2014b) examine the rela-
tionship between agriculture growth, rural poverty and income inequality in Pakistan
over the period 1990–2010. The results show that rural development and national
income per capita both have a negative correlation with poverty and income inequality,
while there is a positive association with agriculture growth in Pakistan.
Both poverty and sectoral growth have been increasing in Pakistan, hence there is a
pressing need to evaluate and analyse the sectoral growth–poverty nexus and to find the
inter-relationship. In the following sections an effort has been made to measure pro-poor
sectoral contributions in the context of Pakistan.
3. Data and methodology
The Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) and Pakistan Integrated Household
Survey (PIHS) conducted by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) in Pakistan provide
data from 1960 to 2011 for this study. These household surveys are unit-recorded data,
and are used for this study. The GoP (2012) report provides a baseline for poverty,
where 2350 calories are the cut-off point for all Pakistan. For income inequality, micro-
data are taken from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan. Anwar (2006) and GoP
(2012) have estimated inequality parameters. The same parameter estimate is taken as a
reference in this study. The data for agriculture (AGR); industry (IND); manufacturing
(MAN); Commodity producing (CPS) and services (SER) value added as percentages of
GDP come from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2011), which is published by
the World Bank. These variables are included as a proxy in the model for overall devel-
opment policies pursued by Pakistan.
3.1. Analytical framework
3.1.1. Pro-poor Growth Index (PPGI)
Kakwani and Pernia (2001) reflect that proportionally greater benefits to the poor rather
than non-poor determine pro-poor growth. Their Pro-Poor Growth Index (PPGI) shows
the ratio of the elasticities for total poverty reduction and poverty reduction in the case
of distribution-neutral growth. A ration greater than 1 means pro-poor growth. The
PPGI (/) can be formally written as:




where d reflects the total poverty elasticity of growth and g means the growth elasticity
of poverty (holding inequality constant). Growth is pro-poor if the accompanying
change in inequality decreases the total poverty. Thus, the growth is pro-poor if the total
elasticity of poverty is greater than the growth elasticity of poverty.
3.1.2. Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR)
The pro-poor growth index (PPGI) measures the distribution of growth benefits among
the poor and non-poor without accounting for the level of the actual growth rate. In
response to this, Kakwani and Son (2002) suggested another pro-poor growth method
‘poverty equivalent growth rate’ (PEGR). The PEGR is defined as the growth resulting
in the same level of poverty reduction as the present growth rate with inequality as a
constant. The PEGR is derived from the multiplication of PPGI by the growth rate of
mean income.
The PEGR (c) can be written as:
c ¼ ðd=nÞc ¼ /c (2)
where c ¼ dLnðlÞ is the growth rate of the average income and / ¼ d=g is the pro-poor
growth index developed by Kakwani and Pernia (2001). This equation indicates that
growth is pro-poor if c is greater than c. If c lies between 0 and c, the growth is
escorted by an increasing inequality but poverty still decreases.
The PEGR addresses both the magnitude of growth and the benefits of growth the
poor receive. Moreover, the PEGR satisfies the basic monotonicity condition such that
the proportional reduction in poverty is a monotonically increasing function of the
PEGR. To attain a fast decrease in poverty, it is thus proposed that the PEGR ought to
be maximised rather than the growth rate alone.
From the Atkinson theorem, if gðpÞ[ 0 or gðpÞ\0 for all p, then poverty clearly
decreases between two periods. The upward poverty growth curve shifts the decrease
the poverty. This proposes that the area under the poverty growth curve can be used as








which can also be written as:
c ¼ c D lnðGÞ (4)
where
c ¼ D lnðlÞ





½lnðpÞ  lnðLðpÞÞdp (5)
is a new relative measure of inequality.
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The second term in equation (5) measures the variation in inequality. If the inequal-
ity measured by G decreases, then the pro-poor growth rate will be greater than the
axial growth rate of the average income. Thus, there will be a gain or a loss in growth
rate due to changes in inequality. Growth will be pro-poor if there is a gain in growth
rate and anti-poor if there is a loss in growth rate. The gain in growth rate is captured
through the percentage increase in G: if G decreases by 1%, the gain in growth rate
will be equal to 1%.
This curve also reduces poverty with upwards shifts. This suggests that the area
under the growth incidence curve can also be used as a measure of pro-poor growth.




rðpÞdp ¼ c D lnðAÞ (6)
where A given by




is the Atkinson (1970) measure of inequality when the utility function is any linear
function of a logarithm of individual income. Equation (6) suggests that there is a gain
(loss) in growth rate when Atkinson’s measure of inequality decreases (increases). The
gain (loss) in the growth rate is measured by the percentage decrease (increase) in A: if
A decreases (increases) by 1% the gain (loss) in growth rate will be equal to 1%.
4. Results and discussions
Economic growth is a dominant anti-poverty instrument. Pakistan’s economy has spe-
cific factors that favour growth benefit to the poor. Pro-poor growth deals with the
dynamic features of growth-poverty-inequality. Pro-poor growth is calculated by using
two sets of household survey conducted at two different points of time. Results from
using the Pro-poor Growth Index on these data sets determine whether that period is
pro-poor or otherwise. Table 3 shows the sectoral pro-poor growth, i.e. agriculture,
industry, manufacturing, commodity-producing and services sectors of Pakistan. The
literature regards ten phases between 1964–2011 as pro-poor in the agriculture sector,
i.e. 1969–70; 1970–71; 1971–72; 1972–79; 1985–86; 1986–87; 1987–88; 1988–91;
1993–94 and 2002–2006, whereas the remaining periods are pro-rich or anti-poor (the
index value is less than one). In the year 1964–67, a 1% growth rate caused 2.154%
reduction in poverty incidence. Two main factors explain this reduction in poverty, i.e.
–2.154% growth effect and the 0.766% pure inequality effect. This means that if
inequality had not increased, a 1% growth would have reduced poverty by 2.154% if
inequality was stagnant. The 0.66% corresponding value of the pro-poor growth index
was consistently less than the benchmark. This suggests that during 1964–67, growth in
the agriculture sector was moderately pro-poor, which shows that the poor benefited
proportionally more than the non-poor.
The poverty equivalent growth rates were, overall, higher than the actual growth
rates in rural Pakistan during 1972–79. For example, the PEGR was 638.82%, corre-
sponded to the 30.41% agricultural value added in 1972–79, indicating that the poor
benefited relatively much more than the non-poor, resulting in a dramatic reduction in
poverty; the rural head-count ratio decreased from 49.11% in 1969–70 to 32.51% in
718 K. Zaman et al.

















1964–67 Growth elasticity −2.154 2.388 3.213 1.552 −0.910
Inequality elasticity 0.766 0.075 0.101 0.041 −0.028
Total poverty
elasticity
−1.388 2.463 3.314 1.593 −0.938
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.644 1.031 1.031 1.026 1.031
1967–69 Growth elasticity −1.494 −0.950 −1.068 −3.205 4.675
Inequality elasticity 0.588 −0.151 −0.169 −0.509 0.743
Total poverty
elasticity
−0.906 −1.101 −1.237 −3.714 5.418
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.606 1.159 1.158 1.159 1.159
1969–70 Growth elasticity −1.501 2.195 14.154 −64.267 17.708
Inequality elasticity −1.502 −3.106 −20.030 90.947 −25.059
Total poverty
elasticity
−3.003 −0.911 −5.876 26.680 −7.351
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
2.001 −0.415 −0.415 −0.415 −0.415
1970–71 Growth elasticity 13.650 −3.551 −4.162 −46.536 −10.728
Inequality elasticity 1.347 0.705 0.826 −68.090 2.130
Total poverty
elasticity
14.997 −2.846 −3.336 −114.626 −8.598
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.801 0.802 2.463 0.801
1971–72 Growth elasticity 1.512 1.791 2.615 6.840 −8.831
Inequality elasticity 0.660 −0.180 −0.177 −0.465 0.600
Total poverty
elasticity
2.172 1.611 2.438 6.375 −8.231
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.437 0.899 0.932 0.932 0.932
1972–79 Growth elasticity −0.219 −1.731 6.392 2.448 −1.638
Inequality elasticity −4.381 −0.121 −4.080 −1.563 1.045
Total poverty
elasticity
−4.600 −1.852 2.312 0.885 −0.593
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
21.005 1.070 0.362 0.362 0.362
1979–85 Growth elasticity 3.587 4.140 −6.827 5.453 −3.209
Inequality elasticity −1.050 1.105 −1.723 1.376 −0.810
Total poverty
elasticity
2.537 5.245 −8.550 6.829 −4.019
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.707 1.267 1.252 1.252 1.252
1985–86 Growth elasticity 4.687 −2.311 −3.855 −17.502 −144.134
Inequality elasticity 1.093 1.045 −3.541 −16.105 −132.623
Total poverty
elasticity
5.780 −1.266 −7.396 −33.607 −276.757
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.233 0.548 1.919 1.920 1.920
1986–87 Growth elasticity 2.618 −4.919 −6.153 27.668 −9.682
Inequality elasticity 1.654 −2.126 1.253 −5.637 1.972
(Continued)




















4.272 −7.045 −4.900 22.031 −7.710
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.632 1.432 0.796 0.796 0.796
1987–88 Growth elasticity 6.753 −7.983 −13.866 −29.156 45.329
Inequality elasticity 0.274 1.860 3.231 6.795 −10.579
Total poverty
elasticity
7.027 −6.123 −10.635 −22.361 34.750
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.041 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767
1988–91 Growth elasticity 7.223 −10.837 −20.979 12.647 −24.364
Inequality elasticity 0.125 −2.617 −5.067 3.055 −5.885
Total poverty
elasticity
7.348 −13.454 −26.046 15.702 −30.249
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.017 1.241 1.242 1.242 1.242
1991–93 Growth elasticity −0.302 −0.811 −1.666 1.753 6.570
Inequality elasticity 0.434 1.174 2.413 −2.538 −9.514
Total poverty
elasticity
0.132 0.363 0.747 −0.785 −2.944
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
−0.437 −0.448 −0.448 −0.448 −0.448
1993–94 Growth elasticity −7.073 9.146 9.800 −84.258 −8.717
Inequality elasticity −0.394 6.280 6.729 −57.854 −5.986
Total poverty
elasticity
−7.467 15.426 16.529 −142.112 −14.703
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
1.056 1.687 1.687 1.687 1.687
1994–97 Growth elasticity −6.110 4.740 −13.789 11.555 42.692
Inequality elasticity 0.891 −4.445 12.933 −10.838 −40.041
Total poverty
elasticity
−5.219 0.295 −0.856 0.717 2.651
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.854 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
1997–99 Growth elasticity 4.688 −13.626 −7.794 180.591 −54.042
Inequality elasticity −1.786 4.467 2.555 −59.203 17.716
Total poverty
elasticity
2.902 −9.159 −5.239 121.388 −36.326
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.619 0.672 0.672 0.672 0.672
1999–2002 Growth elasticity 16.823 17.667 −6.697 −3.117 −15.162
Inequality elasticity −0.197 34.607 13.110 −6.105 −29.701
Total poverty
elasticity
16.626 52.274 6.413 −9.222 −44.863
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.988 2.959 −0.958 2.959 2.959
2002–2005 Growth elasticity 2.286 −81.273 −0.930 −6.188 −6.032
Inequality elasticity −1.905 −21.716 −5.538 −1.653 −1.611
Total poverty
elasticity
0.381 −102.989 −6.468 −7.841 −7.643
(Continued)
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1972–79, which is almost a 16.6% decline in head count ratio. This fast reduction of
destitution amid the 1972–79 periods was accomplished through two elements. One var-
iable was a high economic growth rate of around 7–8% for every annum that had pre-
vailed in the economy. The other component was a consistent decrease in disparity,
which encouraged a quick reduction in neediness notwithstanding the positive growth
rates. Agriculture assumed an imperative part in the early phases of pro-poor growth.
The concentration of the poor in the sector, the large size of its growth linkages to other
sectors, and the positive externalities from assuring food security and reducing food
prices are a few indirect contributions to pro poor growth, other than its direct contribu-
tion to growth (Byerlee, Diao, & Jackson, 2005).
After the period of 1997 to 2005, agriculture value added became higher than the
PEGRs. This indicates that the poor reforms (in terms of providing high yield of varie-
ties of seed, tractors, and threshers, etc., which were the novel reforms in green revolu-
tionary periods) in the agriculture sector had adverse impacts on the poor rather than on
the non-poor. This result is normal in most circumstances as the poor are more defence-
less against such financial shocks. This, in turn, requires a permanent arrangement of a
social security net, which can secure defenceless groups of individuals in the society
from financial downturns. There has been an indication of recovery in the economy in
2008–11; the head-tally proportion declined from 39.26% in 2002 to 28.89% in 2011.
In spite of this positive sign, our result recommends that the growth process is not clas-




















0.167 1.267 6.955 1.267 1.267
2005–2006 Growth elasticity −0.475 0.350 0.247 −3.957 −1.721
Inequality elasticity −5.308 0.244 0.172 −2.754 −1.198
Total poverty
elasticity
−5.783 0.594 0.419 −6.711 −2.919
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
12.175 1.697 1.696 1.696 1.696
2006–2008 Growth Elasticity 0.629 −3.218 0.878 4.482 1.060
Inequality elasticity −3.673 −2.749 0.750 3.828 0.906
Total poverty
elasticity
−3.044 −5.967 1.628 8.310 1.966
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
−4.839 1.854 1.854 1.854 1.855
2008–2011 Growth elasticity −16.935 21.229 −2.427 1.248 −31.843
Inequality elasticity 0.048 19.686 −2.250 1.157 −29.527
Total poverty
elasticity
−16.887 40.915 −4.677 2.405 −61.370
Pro-poor growth
index (PPGI)
0.997 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Note: For the agriculture sector, we used agriculture value added as a percentage of GDP for the proxy of
growth while rural poverty and rural inequality are taken for pro-poor growth decomposition analysis. The
manufacturing sector, industrial sector, commodity producing and the services sector’s value added contribu-
tion in GDP are taken as a proxy for growth, while urban poverty and urban inequality are taken for decompo-
sition of the pro-poor growth.
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 721
stream relatively to the non-poor more than to poor people. The result indicates that rel-
ative to the non-poor, the poor general profited less from the revitalisation of agricul-
tural processes; among the poor the ultra-poor got relatively more profits. Broad-based
agricultural productivity raises livelihoods of poor ranch families and family units of
landless workers who fundamentally rely on agricultural wages (Rosegrant & Hazell,
2000).
Table 3 shows Pakistan’s industrial growth experience in the 1970s. Amid 1970–72,
growth was not delegated as pro-poor. Disregarding the very nearly 23.59% of industrial
commitment in GDP for that period, the growth process did not relatively profit the
poor more than the non-poor. This happened on the grounds that the unfriendly effects
of the increment in disparity in that period had neutralised and actually exceeded the
good effects anticipated from the industrial growth. Specifically, the corresponding profit
streaming to the pro-poor in 1971–72 was considerably short of that streaming to poor
people: the extent of PEGRS becomes low in light of the fact that the poverty measure
is more susceptible to the prosperity of the poorest individual. Amid 1979–85, the PEG-
RS were higher than the real growth rates. Along these lines, industrial growth is char-
acterised as pro-poor during 1979 and 1985 in that it profited the poor relatively more
than the non-poor. The pro-poor growth came about because of the positive impacts of
both high industrial growth rates and inequality decrease over the period. Five subse-
quent phases are reported as anti-poor where poor substantial not benefited from indus-
trial growth more than the non-poor, i.e. 1985–86; 1987–88. 1992–93. 1996–97 and
1998–99. The trend was reversed during 2002–11 when the PEGRs were higher than
the industry value added, which shows that industrial growth is considered as pro-poor
between the periods of 2002 to 2011 (in five phases, i.e. 1999–2002; 2002–05.
2005–06; 2006–08 and 2008–2011).
The results of the manufacturing sector demonstrate that amid the 1964–69 periods,
the PEGRS were reliably higher than the yearly growth rates of the manufacturing sec-
tor. This shows that the growth rates in the manufacturing sector were pro poor in a
manner that profited the poor relatively more than the non-poor. This pattern was
reversed amid 1970–79, when the PEGRS were less than the manufacturing growth rate,
which demonstrates that growth is considered as anti-poor between 1970 and 1979. The
positive growth of the manufacturing sector would not trickle down to the poor as con-
trasted with the non-poor in the resulting stages, i.e. 1986–87, 1987–88, 1992–93,
1996–97, 1998–99 and 1999–2002. Be that as it may, in 2002–11, the poverty equiva-
lent growth rates are generally higher than the real growth in the manufacturing sector.
For example, the PEGR was 37.88% in 2008–11, while the manufacturing value added
was 19.65% in the same period. This intimates that the poor profited relatively more
than the non-poor, as was reflected in a sensational decrease in poverty; the urban head-
count ratio diminished from 22.69% in 1999–02 to 15.02% in 2008–11 which is just
about a 7.67% decrease in head count ratio. This quick reduction in poverty was
attained because of two variables. One variable was a high economic growth rate of
around 3–5% for every annum that had prevailed in the economy. The other component
was an enduring decrease in inequality, which encouraged a quick diminishment in pov-
erty notwithstanding the positive growth rates. In the event that the growth stays pro-
poor in the consequent years, as reflected in the year 2008–11, there is a probability that
manufacturing growth trickles down to the poor more than the non-poor.
The pro-poor growth index is generally higher than the actual growth of the com-
modity producing sector in Pakistan amid the periods 1964–67; 1967–69; 1970–71;
1979–85; 1985–86; 1988–91; 1993–94; 1999–2002; 2002–2005; 2005–2006;
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2006–2008 and 2008–11. The result proposes that the poor profited relatively more than
the non-poor. This fast decrease in poverty in the commodity producing sector was
accomplished primarily because of two variables. One element was the high growth of
the commodity producing sector; the other variable was a consistent decrease in urban
disparity, this encouraged a fast decline in poverty, notwithstanding the positive growth
rates. This pattern was reversed amid 1969–70; 1971–72; 1972–79; 1986–87; 1987–88;
1991–93; 1994–97 and 1997–99 where the poverty equivalent growth rates are gener-
ally more diminutive than the actual growth rates of the commodity producing sector.
This proposes that the poor do not receive any considerable profits from the develop-
ment of the commodity producing sector in those periods, in contrast with the non-poor.
The pro-poor growth assessment in the services sector of Pakistan demonstrates that
out of 21 family surveys, 11 phases are viewed as pro-poor in the services sector, i.e.
1964–67; 1967–69; 1978–85; 1985–86; 1988–91; 1993–94; 1999–2002; 2002–2005;
2005–2006; 2006–2008 and 2008–11 while remaining periods are pro rich or hostile to
the poor (the index value is less than value 1). In the year 1964–67, a 1% growth rate
prompts a decrease in poverty by 0.910%. This decrease in poverty could be clarified
by two primary variables, one is a pure growth effect of –0.910% and the other is pure
inequality effect of –0.028%. The corresponding value of the pro-poor growth index is
around 1.031% which was higher than the benchmark. This proposes that in 1964–67,
growth in the services sector was profoundly pro-poor which shows that the poor prof-
ited relatively more than the non-poor. Additionally, in 1972–79, the poverty equivalent
growth rates were higher than the actual growth rates in the services sector of Pakistan.
For instance, the PEGR was 61.34 for every penny in 1979–85, although the services
quality included was really 45.98%. This suggests that, the poor profited relatively more
than the non-poor, as was reflected in a sensational reduction in poverty; the urban
head-count ratio decreased from 30.20% in 1971.72 to 21.17% in 1979–85, which is
very nearly a 9.03% decrease in head count ratio. This fast decrease in poverty amid
the 1979–85 periods was accomplished because of two components. One variable was a
high growth rate of services sector around 3–4% for every annum that had prevailed in
the economy. The other variable was a consistent decrease in disparity, which encour-
aged a quick decrease in poverty notwithstanding the positive growth rates. This pattern
vanished during 1986–87; 1987–88 and 1994–97 where actual growth rates of the ser-
vices sector were higher than the PEGRS. This shows the poor did not get considerable
profits from the positive growth of the services sector in contrast to the non-poor. There
has been an indication of recovery in the economy in 1997–99; the head-count ratio
declined from 30.20% in 1971–72 to 19.13% in 1997–99. Notwithstanding this positive
sign, our result proposes that the growth process is not classifiable as pro poor. The
profits produced from the positive growth during 1997–99 did stream relatively to the
non-poor more than to the poor. The result indicates that compared with the non-poor,
the poor general profited less from the recovery of the services process; among the poor
the ultra-poor got relatively more profits. This result further extended after the years
2002–05 till 2008–11 where the pro-poor growth index was higher than the benchmark
(the index value is greater than one); if the growth stays pro-poor in the consequent
years, as reflected in the year 2008–11, there is the probability that the services sector
trickles down to the poor more than the non-poor.
The gains and losses of the agriculture, industry, manufacturing, commodity produc-
ing and the services sectors are obtained by subtracting the sectoral growth from the
poverty equivalent growth rates in Table 4.
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Table 4 shows the gains or losses of sectoral growth where gains of growth rates imply
a decline in inequality, while losses imply an increase in inequality. Substantial gains in
agriculture value added are quite noticeable in the years 1969–70; 1971–72; 1972–79;
1986–87 and 2005–2006. There were gains in agriculture growth equivalent to 36.86;
3.51; 15.93; 16.59 and 239.87% respectively per annum because of falling inequality in
those periods. The result suggests that the poor were able to benefit proportionally much
more from growth than in the other periods. This growth pattern led to an unprecedented
reduction in inequality in rural Pakistan, while substantial losses in industrial growth are
noticeable in the years 1969–70; 1985–86; 1991–93 and 1994–97, which were equivalent
to –31.58; –10.55; –36.84 and –22.76% respectively per annum. By contrast, the losses
were merely –2.18% per year in the 1971–72 period. The result implies that the poor were
able to benefit proportionally less from growth. This growth pattern led to an unprece-
dented increase in inequality in urban Pakistan. There are six phases of manufacturing
growth that give gains to the poor of more than 10 percentage points, i.e. 1985–86;
1993–94; 2002–2005; 2005–2006; 2006–2008 and 2008–11. There were gains in growth
equivalent to 14.95; 11.45; 92.33; 12.92; 16.35 and 18.22% respectively per annum
because of falling inequality in those periods. The result concludes that the poor were able
to benefit proportionally much more from growth than in the other periods. This growth
pattern led to an unprecedented reduction in inequality in urban Pakistan. The actual
growth of the commodity producing sector between the years 1985–86; 1993–94; 1999–
2002; 2006–2008 and 2008–11 was 67.25%, 66.59%, 62.72%, 66.78% and 63.45%
respectively while the effective growth rate was 129.12%, 112.34%, 185.58%, 123.81%
and 122.27% respectively. The gains of 61.85%, 45.75%, 122.86%, 57.03% and
58.82% respectively were obtained from the commodity producing sector of Pakistan.
During 1964–67, the poor’s gain from the services sector’s growth is 1.291% only;
however, in the subsequent phases of pro-poor growth, the poor received gains, i.e.
45.10% in 1985–86, 96.44% in 1999–2002, 14.09% in 2002–2005, 35.79% in
2005–2006; 45.11% in 2006–2008 and 49.01% in 2008–11 respectively.
The above results complement the evidence obtained from the ‘sectoral decomposi-
tion’ of poverty in Pakistan and may indeed have a strong bearing on the sectoral shares
of poverty.
5. Summary and conclusion
Pro-poor sectoral analysis facilitates and promotes the formulation and implementation
of sectoral-related policies that may have a positive impact on the poor. To achieve this,
the present study establishes and measures the pro-poor growth index at sectoral level
by using the methodology of pro-poor growth proposed by Kakwani and Son (2002),
i.e. whether the poor obtained gains or losses from sectoral growth. This technique can
also be applied to a wide range of indicators of economic well-being and to assumptions
about the poor.
The result shows that compared with the non-poor, the poor overall benefited less
from the revitalisation of the agriculture process. The poor received substantial gains
from agriculture value added, which were quite evident in the five major years, i.e.
1969–70; 1971–72; 1972–79; 1986–87 and 2005–2006. There were gains in agriculture
growth equivalent to 36.86; 3.51; 15.93; 16.59 and 239.87% respectively per annum
because of a falling inequality in those periods. The poverty equivalent growth rates
are, overall, higher than the actual growth of the commodity producing sector in
Pakistan during the years 1964–67; 1967–69; 1970–71; 1979–85; 1985–86; 1988–91;
726 K. Zaman et al.
1993–94; 1999–2002; 2002–2005; 2005–2006; 2006–2008 and 2008–11. The result
suggests that the poor benefited relatively more than the non-poor. This rapid reduction
in poverty was achieved mainly due to two factors. One factor was the high growth of
the commodity producing sector; the other factor was a steady decline in urban inequal-
ity, this facilitated a rapid reduction in poverty in addition to the positive growth rates.
This study concludes that empowering the poor is essential for pro-poor policies to
address the various aspects of poverty. In order to achieve this, the government officials
and policy makers should re-open the debate about pro-poor growth polices in which
wealth trickles down to the poor. Policies and resources require facilitating the economic
activities for the poor.
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